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How low can it go 
Corporate Governance at Millennium BCP 
On May 28, 2007 a General meeting was held between the Millennium BCP shareholders who 
were called to participate and vote upon a change in the governance model of the bank. This 
change was to give back the Supervisory Board the power of electing the Executive Board but, 
even more, it would materialize a dilemma faced by the bank: to keep a Two-tier Board giving 
the Supervisory Board, chaired by Jardim Gonçalves, the power of choosing the Executive 
Board or to change it to a One-tier Board where the Executive Board, led by Paulo Teixeira 
Pinto, would manage the bank’s daily operations independently. The items on the agenda, 
presented by Jardim Gonçalves, represented a true intimidation from the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board and there could be only one winner, either Jardim Gonçalves, the 
experienced banker responsible for the bank for the past 20 years, or Paulo Teixeira Pinto, his 
successor as CEO with impressive expectations for the bank and a failed acquisition (of Banco 
Português de Investimento) already in his resume. 
In the end, Jardim Gonçalves left through a side door, defeated and surrounded by bodyguards 
and journalists. José Berardo supported Teixeira Pinto and left the GM exuberant and ready to 
announce the defeat of the former leader to the countryi. Berardo, borrowed enormous amounts 
of money from BCP itself and the Portuguese national bank, Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), 
to increase his stake as a BCP shareholderii. Having borrowed more than €300 million from 
CGD to invest in the equity of the bank, he became the most activist individual shareholder of 
the bank. 
Power over BCP would eventually lead to political disputes later in 2008 and it can be seen as 
an example of how 20 years of leadership might fall. (Exhibit 1) 
History of BCP 
In 1975, following the end of the dictatorial regime1, the Portuguese banking sector was 
nationalized. The 1976 Portuguese Constitution prohibited re-privatizations of the existent 
 
1 From 1933 to 1974, the Portuguese Republic was characterized by a nationalist and fascist regime, led by António 
de Oliveira Salazar.  
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institutions and furthermore, the banking activity was prohibited to private institutions.iii 
Whoever wanted to access the banking services had to rely on state-owned banks or foreign 
banking institutions already established in the country. Only in 1984, after changing the law, 
three new banks were authorized to initiate business in Portugal: two foreigners, Manufacturers 
Hannover and Chase Manhattan Bank, and one national, Banco Português de Investimento 
(investment bank). 
João Rendeiro, former BCP’s shareholder and founder of Banco Privado Português, stated that 
the bank’s creation was “a laboratory result from McKinsey’s drawing board”iv. Manuel 
Violante2 and Christopher de Beck3 would have fierce discussions in the working space to build 
the most solid business model, capable of exploring the underdeveloped financial Portuguese 
market like no other. A huge investment would be allocated to create the most advanced IT 
infrastructure among the Portuguese banks capable of serving the strategic decisions made by 
Jardim Gonçalves and his team. 
The Leader 
Jorge Manuel Jardim Gonçalves was the man appointed to build and manage the bank’s 
activities. Born in Funchal, Madeira in 1935, to a very religious family, he studied engineering 
and after a short professional experience on Port of Leixões, he entered the banking industry 
through Banco de Agricultura, in Portugal, taught by Eduardo Consiglieri Pedroso. He would 
later bring this experienced banker to BCP’s administration. He then moved to Banco Popular, 
in Spain, motivated by the nationalization of the Portuguese banking sector, in 1974, and joined 
Opus Dei4. In 1977 he returned to Portugal to become a member of the executive board 
of Banco Português do Atlântico and joined BCP administration in 1984, invited by Américo 
Amorim. Jardim Gonçalves called Manuel Violante to help building BCP, establishing himself 
as one of the biggest bankers in the Portuguese history. The first choice to lead the new bank’s 
project was Fernandes Tato, president of Banco Borges e Irmão. However, he declined the 
offer, since he believed that a private bank would never succeed in Portugal. His lack of vision 
opened a clear path for Jardim Gonçalves. 
 
2 Manuel Violante studied power engineering and economics in Portugal and later moved to France to study at 
Insead. In 1975 he joined the McKinsey’s office in Paris. Worked in Italy, Algeria and then moved to the Spanish 
offices of the firm. There he intensified its responsibilities as Financial Consultant, working with BPA, Banco 
Totta & Açores and BCP in 1984/85. 
3 Christopher de Beck was the man responsible for building the IT infrastructure of BCP. Trustworthy by Manuel 
Violante and Jardim Gonçalves, he joined the Executive Board in 1988 and remained there for more than 20 years. 
4 Opus Dei, in English The Work of God, is a catholic prelature founded in Spain in 1928 by Josemaría Escrivá 
where members are called to sanctify their ordinary lives, through work and professional competence. 
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Freedom to Govern 
Since the very beginning, the management team established a strict separation between itself 
and the shareholders. One of the principles was: the bank would not be a “self-service for 
shareholders, being attributed to the executive board full autonomy and responsibility of 
management”v. Jardim Gonçalves would only accept the invitation if this condition was met. 
On June 17th, 1985, the limited liability company was constituted and during the first General 
Meeting the Executive Board was elected. It was formed by Jorge Jardim Gonçalves (CEO), 
Eduardo Consiglieri Pedroso, Eurico Nunes, Francisco Ferreira da Silva, and Luís da Mota 
Freitas. 
The bank created a Delegated Committee5 (Exhibit 2) composed by its key shareholders (some 
of which would eventually become big borrowers of the bankvi). They would be informed about 
the annual budgets and strategies, follow the evolution of the bank’s business and evaluate the 
management initiatives to be proposed at the GM. Furthermore, they should advise on capital 
increases, and other relevant management decisions that were presented by the Executive 
Board, some in regard to their own debt and investments. The bank did not have a relatively 
independent board of directors, common practice of the Portuguese companies at that time. 
The first fifteen years 
According to Maria Teixeira Alvesvii, Mr. Violante’s experience in the banking industry helped 
Jardim Gonçalves for approximately fifteen years. Client segmentation and a strong 
technological infrastructure were defined as priorities by Jardim Gonçalves and the McKinsey’s 
Consultant. 
The bank’s first ten years were characterized by strong organic growth with annual growth rates 
of approximately 15%viii. BCP was able to segment its clients from the very beginning, thus 
offering a much more suited range of financial products. As in any new and small bank, the 
clients were, on one side, high net worth individuals, served by BCP Particulares, and on the 
other, small and medium enterprises, served by BCP Empresas. Later, 
through NovaRede (“mid-income range” individuals) the bank established itself as one of the 
most promising players in the domestic market. As the bank reached a broader clientele, the 
cross-selling of financial products also became an important strategy.  
 
5 The name of this corporate body was changed to Senior Board in 1993. 
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BCP offered an account manager to all clients and remunerated checking accounts, a unique 
feature in Portugal at that time. Also, clients had access to the Portuguese booming stock 
marketix through the bank's systems, without needing external brokers. Furthermore, the robust 
systems of market monitoring helped the bank to constantly improve the quality and range of 
new products from insurance to personalized investment plans. From the initial two branches 
(one in Porto and the other one in Lisbon) and a vision of “knowing our target market by their 
names, surnames, and addresses” the bank expanded to more than 300 branches by 1993. 
The bank’s fast growth led to discussions about a capital increase only four months after 
opening for business. The first one, directed to the initial shareholders, was completed in March 
1987. The second one was directed to shareholders, bank’s employees and the general public 
in September of the same year. In two years BCP’s equity increased from €17 million to €35 
million and stocks were at this point available to all the interested public, with BCP’s brokerage 
system as the main driver in gathering new investors. Also, in 1992, the Delegated Committee 
discussed if the bank should open their capital increases to international investors. CEO’s plan 
was to issue bonds for the European market and ADRs6 for the American market. 
Some shareholders were sceptical about this strategy. In fact, Américo Amorim, the biggest 
BCP shareholder with approximately 25% of the bank’s equity, stated that he could cover the 
capital needs of the bank. He would say that Jardim Gonçalves was stepping away from the 
initial project of the bank while the initial shareholders were losing strength on GMs. The CEO 
identified some problems in this proposal and argued that there were other interested parties in 
the bank’s decisions apart from Américo Amorim.7 This was the first dispute between Jardim 
Gonçalves and one of the bank’s shareholders and he managed it by proposing to the GM  the 
limitation of the number of votes per shareholder. Amorim expressed his intention to vote 
against and claimed that he could not be jeopardised for his position on the bank’s equity. The 
measure was voted favourably on the 22nd of March 1993, setting the voting rights to a 
maximum of 10% and AIP delegated BCP’s Executive Board to select a buyer for 15% of its 
share in BCP equity. Banco Central Hispano-Americano was the chosen institution and got one 
place on the Senior Board, which was still chaired by Américo Amorim. 
 
6 According to OECD, an American Depository Receipt (ADR) is a certificate issued by a U.S. depository bank 
that is negotiable and represents a specified number of shares of a foreign company. These products trade in the 
U.S. markets as any stock would trade. 
7 During 1990, Américo Amorim concentrated all his BCP equity in one company called Amorim Investimentos e 
Participações, SGPS (AIP) and Banco Indo-Suez entered AIP’s capital structure with a 20% share in that same 
year. 
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Jardim Gonçalves then directed the bank to acquisition strategies. The first attempt was to 
acquire Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor in 1993 from the Portuguese state. However, the process 
was called off due to disagreements on the price. BCP would eventually buy BPSM in 2000 
since the state did not want the bank to fall under a foreigner group. Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
the state-owned bank, then sold its majority position of the bank to BCP instead of Banco 
Santander Central Hispano (the Spanish contender)x.  
In 1995, Jardim Gonçalves launched a hostile tender offer for Banco Português do Atlântico 
(BPA), a well-known institution for BCP’s president. On the run to acquire a much bigger bank 
(30% bigger), the management realized the effort that had to be made to integrate the two banks’ 
IT systems and employees. BCP entered the market as an ultramodern and dynamic bank with 
carefully chosen employees. BPA’s employees were, on the other hand, older, not as 
enthusiastic nor motivated and used to a much slower working pace. Nevertheless, the 
acquisition would be a defensive move against the consolidation trend that European financial 
services were facing, and it would enable better commercial capabilities. Risk diversification 
was also important because the combined institution would increase the volume of the insurance 
business and other cross-sold financial products where BPA was not performing well. The 
acquisition and further integration were a very important achievement for the bank as it proved 
the existence of growth opportunities from acquisitions.   
An international focus emerged at the end of the XX century, when the bank looked to expand 
its business to Poland and Greece. The accumulated experience would be enough to explore 
these two financial markets which, like Portugal in the 1980s, were poorly developed. 
Millennium was created in Poland, in 1999, in a joint venture with BIG Bank Gdanski (50% 
split) where the model to be applied was very similar to the one once applied in the beginning 
of BCP. NovaBank was created in Greece in a partnership with the Greek Interamerican 
Hellenic Life Insurance Company to launch a banking business operating very much 
like NovaRede did in Portugal. This was a big year since the bank had joined forces with 
the Achmea group (Dutch insurance group) to develop the group’s banking activities.  BCP 
would, again, use its expertise in the high net worth individuals segment and, furthermore, 
capture a “large and developed European retail banking market”. The project did not go 
through, but the partnership named Eureko8, operating on the insurance business, was kept alive 
 
8 This insurance alliance operating on the European market was formed in 1993 and composed by Ocidental (a 
subsidiary of BCP), the UK-based Friends Provident and the Dutch Avero Centraal Beheer, later called Achmea. 
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and it became BCP’s biggest individual foreign investment. Eureko’s goal was to become one 
of the top-ten “asset gatherers” in Europe, with BCP increasing its position on the alliance from 
a 15% share to 23%, by mid-2000.  
Community banking projects were also worth the attention, and in the US and in France, BCP 
started providing financial services to the Portuguese communities. As for the Iberian market, 
a partnership with Banco Sabadell looked to conquer the peninsula’s e-finance business. 
ActivoBank, for individuals, and Managerland for corporate customers, would be the two main 
initiatives resulting from the partnership. 
Manuel Violante would eventually die in the beginning of 2000 and leave BCP orphan of one 
of its fathers. 
Infinite possibilities 
It seemed that by the end of the century, BCP could participate in all investment opportunities. 
The bank exploited the ease of conceding credit under the Portuguese legislation and extended 
it for capital increases (Exhibit 3). These were conducted in 2000, €17 million concerning the 
conversion of convertible bonds, in 2001, €714 million concerning the acquisition of the 
insurer Imperio and the bank Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor and in 2003 of €930 million, among 
others in more recent times. The bank would grant loans to its clients to buy the new shares, 
receiving those same shares as collateral. The credits were extremely risky which led some 
clients to sue the bank claiming they were convinced by their account managers to buy the 
shares and hold on to them (hard-selling). When confronted by the deputy Francisco Louçã 
about an existent internal document giving the selling strategy to the employees, Jardim 
Gonçalves said: “to persuade, is not to oblige, each one decides for himself.” 
The problems with these loans would not be visible if the share price continued to go up, but it 
did not last long. Jardim Gonçalves blamed the BCP’s bad performance on the stock markets 
on the 9/11 tragedy and its impacts on the insurance alliance, Eureko. João Talone, member of 
the Executive Board of BCP and CEO of the insurance group, resigned on December 2001 due 
to the bad results of the business. The alliance reported losses of around €591 million by 
September 2002, contrasting with the €228.5 million in profits of the previous yearxi, affecting 
the stock price of the bank. Dozens of individuals and families became insolvent and 
foreclosures happened to pay back the loans. The clients’ situation became even more delicate 
as the loans had been sold to factoring enterprisesxii, which were less reasonable on the 
strategies used to recover the money. Others considerably wealthier, like José Berardo, who 
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borrowed from Caixa Geral de Depósitos (the state-owned bank) or João Pereira Coutinho, 
who borrowed from BCP itselfxiii to buy BCP’s stocks, also saw their investments’ value 
substantially reduced. 
The Succession of Jardim Gonçalves 
Jardim Gonçalves held the CEO position for 20 years. Only in March 2005, after renaming all 
the banking business to Millennium, he announced that a successor would be elected. Paulo 
Teixeira Pinto had the unilateral blessing from Jardim Gonçalves, who later communicated the 
decision to the Executive and Senior Boards, respectively. All the Board members were caught 
by surprisexiv. Teixeira Pinto knew nothing about lending, but he had access to very important 
meetings and information about BCP due to his position of secretary-general. His involvement 
as the director of the Millennium Program, a renovation program of the institution, was, for 
some, the ultimate credibility check for the future banker. He was very much aligned with 
Jardim Gonçalves’ conservative ideas and gestures, like a good disciple. For example, they 
were both members of Opus Dei. Jardim Gonçalves’ idea was to choose a man with an 
incredible sense of loyalty, respect and devotion and thought he would be able to continue 
managing the bank’s operations with Teixeira Pinto as CEO. It was expectable that Filipe Pinhal 
would be the first option, since he had been the former president’s right arm for several years. 
Nevertheless, by not choosing one of the oldest and more experienced executives, he prevented 
the board from a hostile environment amongst other members. 
Board members accepted the decision and Paulo Teixeira Pinto kept the same Executive Board 
members to silence and get the precious help of the experienced professionals, very used to 
manage the bank’s business. The Executive Board was then composed by Paulo Teixeira Pinto 
as the president and Filipe Pinhal, Christopher de Beck, Alípio Dias, Francisco de Lacerda, 
António Castro Henriques, Boguslaw Kott, António Rodrigues, and Alexandre Bastos Gomes. 
Under the guidance of Jardim Gonçalves, by this time president of the Senior Board, the year 
of 2005 was considered positive for the bank, having registered a net income increase from 
€528 million, in 2004, to €610 million on a current basis. 
Teixeira Pinto and the split from the master’s ideas 
Only in 2006, when the new CEO announced the intention of doubling the bank’s size, 
executive members, managers, shareholders, and even Jardim Gonçalves started to fear 
unconventional decisions. 
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As part of these decisions, Paulo Teixeira Pinto decided to propose a change of the current 
governance model (Exhibit 4). This new model, adopted on the 13th of March 2006 (Exhibit 
5), set a Double-Tier Board, where an Executive Board, managing the daily operations of the 
institution and elected by the General Meeting, would work independently from a Supervisory 
Board, responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the first board, deliberating on the 
Risk Management policy, independence of the Statutory Auditor and the external auditors. 
Jardim Gonçalves approved the idea but under the proposed model the Supervisory Board 
would not be able to elect the Executive Board. Carlos Tavares, the president of Comissão de 
Mercado e Valores Imobiliários, CMVM (Securities Market Regulator) was very welcoming 
to this new model because it was aligned with the best international practicesxv. However, he 
expressed his concerns about the loss of elective power of the Supervisory Board, as it was not 
contemplated in the law.xvi 
Then, the new CEO took the decision of acquiring Banco Português de Investimento 
(BPI). Both banks had similar history and structure and BPI’s investors backed the foundation 
of BCP. The commercial bank was to be born under the BPI group as a complement to the 
existent investment bank, proving they were very prone to mergers and acquisitions from both 
sides. Jardim Gonçalves discussed a possible merger with Artur Santos Silva (BPI’s president) 
in 1989, for the first time. BCP and BPI had important market shares in commercial and 
investment banking, respectively, so, they were seen as complementary to each other. BCP’s 
president at the time clearly intended the institution to proceed as one. However, after a long 
period of discussion and an almost closed agreement, Artur Santos Silva called off the wedding, 
alleging that his bank should first grow organically. On March 13th, 2006, with Union de 
Banques Suisse (UBS) as underwriter, Paulo Teixeira Pinto presented to the shareholders the 
proposal to acquire BPI for €5.70 a share (ex-dividend of 2005 of €0.12) at a total price of 
€4 332 million for 100% of the outstanding shares. It would represent a 27% premium from the 
last three months' price average and would be financed with 92% new equity (through rights 
issue) and 8% with internal resources. The rationale was as follows: the deal would create an 
unquestionable Portuguese leader; there were estimations of €232 million in annual synergies 
before taxes; both institutions were complementarity in numerous areas, and there was hope 
that the transaction would be accretive for the results.xvii 
Jardim Gonçalves, on the other hand, heard from a Morgan Stanley consultant that their 
prospects for this deal were not that optimistic, and Paulo Teixeira Pinto was aware of it. In a 
position of full support to his successor, Jardim Gonçalves did all the efforts to help closing the 
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deal, including meeting with Banco Itaú (one of BPI’s biggest shareholders) but BPI was 
prompt to consider this offer as hostile and the administration declined it by unanimity. BPI’s 
shareholders were advised not to reduce their positions and the subject would be closed with 
UBS collecting €58.8 million in commissions for the underwriting agreement.xviii 
Francisco Lacerda and António Castro Henriques were the only two executives who helped 
with the offer preparation, later transmitted to António Rodrigues, the CFO. But a few days 
before, the rumours of a tender offer reached the media and the country’s specialized finance. 
Even more, before that, BPI’s administration realized their bank was a target. According to the 
media, stockbrokers then had a big impact on the transmission of this secret information to four 
investors who made millions in just one day: José Berardo (around €1 million), Leopoldo 
Martins (around €450 thousand), Patrick Monteiro de Barros (around €1 million) and the 
society Ruby Capital (around €700 thousand).xix Portuguese courts did not find evidence of 
fraud, though. 
In December 2006, a BPI’s General Meeting would vote on the extinction of its position in 
BCP’s capital but Jardim Gonçalves, as BCP representative, attended the GM to vote against 
the decision since the bank still had a position of 3.8% in BPI, and it’s said that this was the 
first time Jardim Gonçalves used his reputation to intimidate his competitors. BPI remained 
BCP’s biggest shareholder until December 2007. 
The transaction’s success became almost impossible when Banco de Portugal authorized the 
Spanish bank La Caixa to increase their position in BPI from 22% to 33%, in January 2007. 
Paulo Teixeira Pinto was even forced to increase BCP’s position in BPI to try and block a 
possible counteroffer. Followed by an increase in the offered price and another rejection from 
BPI’s shareholders, Teixeira Pinto acknowledged defeat leaving a trail of wounded 
relationships on his Executive Board, as well as the bank’s reputation diminished. The date of 
death for the transaction was the 7th of May 2007. 
The boomerang effect 
Jardim Gonçalves, on the 28th of May 2007, proposed to the General Meeting another change 
in the governance of the institution, in which the president of the Executive Board would be 
elected by the Supervisory Board (chaired by him). This was the beginning of a fight that would 
deeply hurt the bank. Allegedly, Jardim Gonçalves guaranteed the executive president the seat 
on the board. However, Teixeira Pinto’s started to gather shareholders and possible future 
shareholders to help him reduce the experienced banker’s power (Exhibits 6 and 7). At the 
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same time, the public opinion raised its voice against Jardim Gonçalves because of his 
exuberant lifestyle and Opus Dei membership. 
Furthermore, the Senior Board was not as stable as before. It now had 34 members, including 
the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, Voting members, the Chairman of the General meeting of 
Shareholders, the members of the Supervisory Board and the Chairman of the Executive Board 
of Directors, with new members having bad relationships with Jardim Gonçalves, such as 
Energias de Portugal (EDP), Banco Sabadell, Manuel Fino, and Vasco Pessanha. It was 
expected that this Board would agree on everything that would be proposed by the Supervisory 
Board, but this was not the case anymore. Besides, long-dated members, due to the proximity 
with the Chairman, remained there despite the reduced percentage of the bank’s capital (in total, 
less than 30%)xx. 
Paulo Teixeira Pinto gathered enough shareholders to block the proposal on the 28th of May 
General Meeting and Jardim Gonçalves left, defeated, still with no power over the bank. 
Shareholders’ fight and a new change in governance 
Tension and disparities increased at the Executive Board, between Paulo Teixeira Pinto, 
Francisco Lacerda, and António Castro Henriques on one side, and the other five directors on 
the other, having the CEO expressed to the Senior Board that he could not lead the bank in such 
conditions. 
The Teixeira Pinto’s efforts to collect allied shareholders resulted in the Pinto’s Seven group. 
Because they had 5% of the bank’s equity, they managed to call another General Meeting, on 
the 6th of August 2007, with the clear objective of dismissing the five executives who were 
against Paulo Teixeira Pinto: Filipe Pinhal, Christopher de Beck, António Rodrigues, Alípio 
Dias, and Alexandre Bastos Gomes. Furthermore, they intended to change back to a one-tier 
Board, where the Supervisory Board would be dismissed. The Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board wrote to the shareholders the following: 
“The proposed [changes] (…) endanger the quality, the experience, the knowledge and the 
culture of the Bank’s Team and, because of that, reduce the trust in management capacity and 
value creation of Your Bank”.xxi 
Paulo Teixeira Pinto and the shareholders gathered by him abandoned the idea. A probable loss 
would be costly for his group’s credibility, so they tried to increase the size of the Executive 
Board, from nine members to thirteen, to include four new directors aligned with Teixeira 
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Pinto’s vision and objectives. Another loss was assumed as soon as Fernando Ulrich 
communicated BPI’s vote against this point at BCP’s General Meeting. 
José Berardo, the loudest shareholder 
Born in Madeira, José Berardo, member of Pinto’s Seven, assumed this war to be personal. 
Justification comes from the fact that Jardim Gonçalves always assumed a far superior status 
in respect to to the businessman, despite his banking experience in Bank of Lisbon and South 
Africa. He became as loud as possible to overthrow the former BCP’s president. Fight over the 
power in BCP became so important that he let go €200 million in gains. He tried to expose the 
expenses with remuneration of members of the corporate bodies, including Jardim Gonçalves, 
and the lack of transparency in his communication with the shareholders. It´s important to 
remember that, at the same time, he was voting to expand the Executive Board, thus increasing 
the expenses in remunerations. Also, the investor would buy shares through Metalgest, 
transferring them to his Foundation, Fundação de Arte Moderna e Contemporânea and never 
showing its financials to the general public. His intention didn´t materialized though, as the 
Remunerations and Welfare Board, constituted by António Gonçalves, João Pinto Basto and 
Pedro Maria Teixeira Duarte, alleged that, in any public company, these subjects should be 
addressed with certain levels of discretion (Exhibits 8 and 9). One should remember that 
Jardim Gonçalves and Teixeira Duarte family had very strict relationships. Both families were 
closely tied to Opus Dei, and João Afonso Teixeira Duarte (brother of Pedro Maria) married 
Sofia Jardim Gonçalves, daughter of the former president Jorge Jardim Gonçalves, and together 
they had 14 children.xxii.xxiii 
From private jet and travels to driver, security, restaurant bills and even the use of a helicopter, 
the former president had it all and kept a €167 thousand monthly pension with the security and 
transportation expenses covered. Jardim Gonçalves protected his pension conditions and later 
in 2010, when the bank’s management tried to cut costs with the huge pensions of former 
executives, he stated that changing them: “Is the same as reviewing the price the bank paid for 
the acquisition of BPA, Mello e Sotto Mayor. There are no competences to change it and they 
[the bank’s Remuneration Committee] know it.”xxiv  
One man down, another one to go 
On the 6th of August 2007, the General Meeting would put an end to the story. Actually, two 
General Meetings: one was public for all shareholders and press, ran by all the formal rules, 
and another one, “anarchic, with lawyers and clients (…) negotiating last-minute deals and 
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strategies to be developed”xxv. Teixeira Pinto acknowledged defeat by eliminating both 
proposals to replace five of the directors and to increase the executive board size. However, due 
to a technical issue, the GM was postponed for the 27th of August. By that time, the fight had 
become unbearable for Teixeira Pinto, so he decided to step out on the 31st of August with a 
package of €10 million, plus annual pension of €500 thousand for the rest of his life. Filipe 
Pinhal, chosen by Jardim Gonçalves, took office as the new CEO on the 3rd of September. 
Directors who have been tied to the cause of Paulo Teixeira Pinto were “punished”. 
Negotiations with Sonangol and Fortis9, previously managed by António Castro Henriques, 
were now the responsibility of Christopher de Beck and António Rodrigues, respectively. These 
were strategic relationships capable of changing the shareholder structure (and so they did) as 
Teixeira Pinto, during the dispute for power, “sold” places on the governing bodies in exchange 
for their support in GMs 
During the first month of Filipe Pinhal as CEO, Pedro Maria Teixeira Duarte continued to lead 
the negotiations with shareholders to find a solution that would bring peace to the institution 
but his intention of satisfying the biggest number of shareholders would conduct to Jardim 
Gonçalves’ dismissal. To make it happen, and considering the chairman had one year remaining 
on the seat, the governance model would have to be changed. 
A “new” one-tier board, with Executive Board, Fiscal Board and an External Auditor was 
consensual among the majority of shareholders and an extended Executive Board was also 
under discussion. When Jardim Gonçalves realized his position was potentially compromised 
he nominated Bayão Horta, member of the Senior and Supervisory Boards, for the negotiation 
task, leaving Pedro Maria Teixeira Duarte behind. Bayão Horta did not have the necessary 
relationships with shareholders, nor the capital to be “accepted” in the discussion so, after the 
failed negotiations, he resigned from all the governing bodies.  
Hidden decisions 
On October 10th, Expresso and Público, two Portuguese newspapers, released news stating that 
BCP, in late 2004, assumed as unrecoverable the €12.5 million borrowed from Jardim 
Gonçalves’ son companies, the Group V.xxvi The decision was not discussed on the Executive 
Board and Carlos Picoito, member of the legal advice office, wrote directly to Alípio Dias, 
 
9 Sonangol is an Angolan state-owned company operating in the oil and natural gas industries. Fortis Group, now 
named Ageas Group, operates in the insurance business partnering with BCP in a joint venture called Seguros 
Millenniumbcp Fortis Grupo Segurador, S.G.P.S., S.A, in 2005. Both companies had been increasing their share 
on BCP’s capital, assuming highly qualified positions. 
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member of the Executive Board, stating that “most of the Group V companies were completely 
paralyzed, without assets or own resources of any kind”. Furthermore, facing the complete lack 
of assets, any legal procedure would be destined to failure. The group’s directors wanted then 
to negotiate a deal with the bank where the debts would be given as unrecoverable and the 
companies extinct. Only two BCP board members were aware of the situation: Alípio Dias and 
Filipe Pinhal, who stated that the default followed all the legal procedures10. The bank was also 
under investigation regarding the renegotiation of €15 million on Goes Ferreira’s companies. 
He was also a member of BCP’s Senior Board and close friend of Jardim Gonçalves. Later, on 
December 2007, Expresso claimed that €28.5 million in loans were considered as unrecoverable 
in these companies, which were not discussed among directors of the Executive Board.  There 
was not a careful analysis by the Audit and Risk Committee, composed only by independent 
members, and neither the IAS 24 procedures were followed (Exhibit 10). 
For the grand finale, Berardo delivered documents to the Portuguese markets and financial 
institutions regulators, CMVM and Banco de Portugal, respectively, alleging illegalities on 17 
offshore entities, without owner, and other 4 owned by members of the Senior Board. These 
last 4 entities, owned by Goes Ferreira, had always been under supervision of the regulators 
and never attracted any suspicion of illegal practices. However, Jardim Gonçalves represented 
their voting rights in the group’s General Meetings, even in the presence of Goes Ferreira, 
indicating that these companies might have been instruments used by the bank under the name 
of a shareholder and member of the Senior Board. 
Berardo provided one document proving that Filipe Pinhal named one of the bank’s directors 
to manage those “owner-free” entities. They were based on the Cayman Islands and used by 
the bank for market manipulation. But the investigation started only when those entities 
reflected liabilities of more than €400 million.  
The inquisitions conducted by CMVM made some employees, who were supporters of Jardim 
Gonçalves, to confess that the operations with these companies were ordered and allowed by 
him. The regulator presented a report with the preliminary conclusions and forced the bank to 
communicate it as a statement: “the financing conditions and the governance model of the 
entities indicate that BCP assumed all the risk of those off-shore entities and that it had 
dominance powers over the life and business of those entities;”. Furthermore: “It was detected 
 
10 Jardim Gonçalves eventually paid the debt of Filipe Jardim Gonçalves in October 2007. 
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market transactions by the referred entities, frequently and in significant amounts, that need 
further investigation to identify possible infractions to the markets’ rules”. xxvii 
Operating only on the secondary market and trading exclusively BCP’s shares with money 
given by the bank, the companies would buy when the price of BCP’s shares was low, and sell 
when the price was high, in the words of João Duque, the delegated specialist by the Portuguese 
courts for the casexxviii. Later, it was discovered that some of these bank’s offshore entities were 
transferred to shareholders, to help the bank reflect lesser liabilities on its balance sheet. 
Portuguese courts used this against Jardim Gonçalves (former president), Filipe Pinhal (former 
president) and António Rodrigues (former CFO), in 2015, and pledged them guilty for market 
manipulation, resulting on the payment of €600 thousand, for Gonçalves, and €300 thousand 
for both Mr. Pinhal and Mr. Rodrigues. 
The end of a reign 
Investigations and disputes continued over time but Jardim Gonçalves agreed to step out of the 
bank on the last day of 2007 after long negotiations with BPI for a merger and that would be 
his last effort to restore the credibility of the bank. On the other hand, shareholders like Berardo 
and Sonangol had different interests, since they feared that very little would be left for them at 
the new institution. BPI pointed out the critical aspect for the success of the new bank, 
Millennium BPI: 
“Millennium BPI will have as shareholders strong and prestigious financial institutions, an 
extended range of Portuguese companies and businessman, institutional investors, business 
partners and thousands of individual investors.” 
Nevertheless, the merger was not successful and new parties entered the fight over power in 
BCP. Political interest increased on the bank’s situation with the two biggest parties (PS and 
PSD) backing two separate lists for the Executive Board. 
The final years of Jardim Gonçalves’ reign were harmful for the biggest Portuguese private 
bank and all its stakeholders. Discussions over the governance model of the bank went back 
and forth but it surely started with the bad performance of the stocks. It even led to personal 
disputes among shareholders and managers, in which changes of the governance model were 
used as the instrument to try and get the power on BCP. Small investors, some of them clients, 
lost thousands of euros with BCP stock. Larger institutional and individual shareholders saw 
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the value of their investment reduced to almost nothing due to a fight that had very little to do 
with strategies for value creation. 
“The Corporate Governance Models might be perfect, but they will not work if the people in 
charge are not the most suited.” 
- Carlos Tavares, President of CMVM, October 23rd, 2014 (in Jornal de Negócios)  
How low can it go: Corporate Governance at Millennium BCP 
18 
 
Exhibit 1 – BCP Stock Price Evolution 
 
Source: Reuters: Banco Comercial Portugues SA. (BCP.LS) 
https://www.reuters.com/companies/BCP.LS/charts 
 
Exhibit 2 – BCP Delegated Committee, 1986 
Corticeira Amorim, Lda. (Chairman) 
Cifial – Centro Industrial de Ferragens, Lda. 
Colep – Companhia Portuguesa de Embalagens, Lda. 
Constantino Mota, Filhos, Sucessores 
Construtora Abrantina, Lda. 
Empresa de Sondagens e Fundações Teixeira Duarte, Lda. 
Hóteis Tivoli, SARL 
José António Ferreira de Magalhães 
Jorge José Valério 
José Machado de Almeida & C., Lda. 
Laboratórios Atral, SARL 
Moniz da Maia, Serra & Fortunato, Empreiteiros, SARL 
Têxtil Manuel Gonçalves, SARL 
Vicaima – Indústria de Madeira e Derivados, Lda. 
Vista Alegre – Empreendimentos Cerâmicos, Lda. 
President of the General Meeting 
President of the Executive Board 
President of the Fiscal Board 
Source: General Secretariat of Banco Comercial Português 
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Source: Millennium BCP (adapted).  https://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/en/Institucional/investidores/Pages/AumentosCapital.aspx. 
 











Source: Millennium BCP. Report on Corporate Governance (2005). 
https://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/en/Institucional/investidores/Documents/RelatorioContas/Annual_Rep2005_II_2.pdf 
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Source: Millennium BCP. Annual Report (2006). 
https://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/en/Institucional/investidores/Documents/RelatorioContas/Annual_Rep2006_II.pdf. 
 










Source: Millennium BCP.    https://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/en/Institucional/investidores/Pages/EstruturaAcionista.aspx. 
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Source: Millennium BCP. https://ind.millenniumbcp.pt/en/Institucional/investidores/Pages/EstruturaAcionista.aspx. 
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Exhibit 9 – BCP Compliance Statement 
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Exhibit 10 – IAS 24 (adapted). 
Objective of IAS 24 
The objective of IAS 24 is to ensure that an entity's financial statements contain the disclosures 
necessary to draw attention to the possibility that its financial position and profit or loss may 
have been affected by the existence of related parties and by transactions and outstanding 
balances with such parties. 
Who are related parties? 
A related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial 
statements (referred to as the 'reporting entity') [IAS 24.9]. 
(a) A person or a close member of that person's family is related to a reporting entity if 
that person: 
(i) has control or joint control over the reporting entity;  
(ii) has significant influence over the reporting entity; or  
(iii) is a member of the key management personnel of the reporting entity or of 
a parent of the reporting entity. 
What are related party transactions? 
A related party transaction is a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related 
parties, regardless of whether a price is charged. [IAS 24.9] 
Disclosure 
Relationships between parents and subsidiaries. Regardless of whether there have been 
transactions between a parent and a subsidiary, an entity must disclose the name of its parent 
and, if different, the ultimate controlling party. If neither the entity's parent nor the ultimate 
controlling party produces financial statements available for public use, the name of the next 
most senior parent that does so must also be disclosed. [IAS 24.16] 
 
Source: Deloitte (adapted). 
https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias24  
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